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Abstract
This paper develops a model of a professional sports league with network externalities by
integrating the theory of two-sided markets into a contest model. In professional team sports,
leagues function as a platform that enables sponsors to interact with fans. In these league-
mediated interactions, positive network effects operate from the fan market to the sponsor
market, while negative network effects operate from the sponsor market to the fan market. Clubs
react to these network effects by charging higher (lower) prices to sponsors (fans). Our analysis
shows that the size of these network effects determines the level of competitive balance within
the league. Traditional models, which do not take network externalities into account, under- or
overestimate the actual level of competitive balance, which may lead to wrong policy decisions.
Moreover, we show that clubs benefit from stronger combined network effects through higher
profits. Finally, we derive policy recommendations for improving competitive balance by taking
advantage of network externalities.JEL Classification Codes:  L11, L13, L83, M21
Keywords:  Competitive balance, contest, multisided market, network externalities, team sports
league
We gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the Swiss National Science Foun-
dation (Grant 100014-120503) and the research fund of the University of Zurich.1 Introduction
The professional team sports industry has a unique organizational structure. It is
the only industry in which production is organized by leagues. This unique organi-
zational structure is the result of the industry-specic production and competition
process. Industry outsiders often tend to regard individual teams as rms and treat
them as production units. Unlike an automobile rm, however, an individual team
cannot produce a marketable product. Each team needs at least one opponent
to play a match. However, even a match between two teams is not an attractive
product. The individual matches must be upgraded by integrating them into an
organized championship race. This upgrade, which gives each individual match ad-
ditional value within the larger context of the championship race, is managed by
the league.
From a sports perspective, each team within a league wants to win as many
games as possible. Economically, however, teams are not so much competitors but
are rather complementors. The quality or economic value of the championship
race depends to a large extent on the level of competitive balance. Unlike Toyota
and Ford, which prefer weak competitors in their industry, sports teams like Real
Madrid, the New York Yankees, and the Dallas Cowboys benet from having strong
opponents within their leagues. A more balanced league usually produces a more
attractive - that is, economically more valuable - product.
Economists have designed various models of sports leagues. In an early contri-
bution, El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) developed a dynamic decision-making model of
a professional sports league and incorporated certain fundamental features of the
North American sports industry such as the reserve clause, player drafts and the sale
of player contracts among teams. They show that revenue sharing does not inu-
ence competitive balance and thus conrm the "invariance proposition".1 Fort and
Quirk (1995) derive similar results in an updated, static version of the El-Hodiri and
Quirk model. Atkinson et al. (1988) contradict the invariance proposition and show
that revenue sharing can improve competitive balance. In their model, Atkinson
et al. adopt a pool-sharing arrangement and a club revenue function that depends
on the team's performance and on the performance of all other teams. Their result
is supported by Marburger (1997), who builds his model on the assumption that
fans care about the relative and absolute quality of teams. Vrooman (1995) shows
that sharing the winning-elastic revenue does not aect competitive balance, while
sharing the winning-inelastic revenue does improve competitive balance. K esenne
1The "invariance proposition" goes back to Rottenberg (1956) and states that the distribution
of playing talent between clubs in professional sports leagues does not depend on the allocation
of property rights to players' services.
2(2000) develops a two-team model consisting of a large- and a small-market club and
shows that a payroll cap, dened as a xed percentage of league revenue divided by
the number of teams, will improve competitive balance as well as the distribution
of player salary within the league.
The recent sports economics literature has suggested modeling a team sports
league by making use of contest theory.2 In his seminal article, Szymanski (2003)
applied Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking contest to ascertain the optimal design of
sports leagues. Based on a model of two prot-maximizing clubs and a club revenue
function that depends on the relative quality of the home team, Szymanski and
K esenne (2004) show that gate revenue sharing decreases competitive balance. This
result is driven by the so-called \dulling eect." The dulling eect describes the well-
known fact in sports economics that revenue sharing reduces the incentive to invest
in playing talent. Dietl and Lang (2008) conrm this nding and further show that
gate revenue sharing increases social welfare.
As this brief literature review shows, analytical models in sports are mainly
focused on the eect of cross-subsidization schemes such as reserve clauses, revenue
sharing and salary caps on competitive balance without taking into account that the
clubs' competition provides the platform for the interaction of various market sides
such as fans, advertisers and sponsors, the media, and merchandising companies.
The interaction of dierent market sides via an intermediary platform creates
what is called a "multisided market." Each of the distinct market sides demands a
specic good or service provided by the intermediary. Frequently, the market sides
do not interact with each other directly; however, they exert network externalities
on each other. These externalities inuence the market's demand structure and the
intermediary's pricing schemes. Fans demand competition and the experience of
a live event, advertisers and sponsors demand an audience that they can inform
about their products or services, the media demand an audience willing to pay for
the use of their services, merchandising companies demand customers who want to
buy their articles, etc. An interaction between two market sides only takes place
because of the underlying sports event. Fans would hardly go to the stadium to look
at advertisement billboards if there were not a match taking place in the stadium
that featured their favorite team. Merchandising companies would sell many fewer
fan articles if their products were not linked to an active sports team, and so on.
These examples underline the importance of the clubs' competition to act as a
platform for the dierent market sides that interact and exert network externalities
on each other.
2The rst approaches in contest theory were made by Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and
Stokey (1983) and Nalebu and Stiglitz (1983).
3Research related to multisided markets is ourishing and has been conducted on
a broad range of topics and industries. For instance, software platforms (Evans et
al., 2004), payment systems (Rochet and Tirole, 2002; Schmalensee, 2002; Wright,
2003, 2004), the Internet (Baye and Morgan, 2001; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003) and
media markets (Crampes et al., 2009; Reisinger et al., 2009). More general models
have been proposed by Rochet and Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2006), Armstrong
and Wright (2007) and Belleamme and Toulemonde (2009). Despite this large
variety of applications, the theory of multisided markets has not yet been applied
to sports leagues. This paper tries to ll this gap.
We add to the literature by contributing to two dierent strands of literature:
on the one hand, the literature on multisided markets and on the other hand, the
literature on analytical models of sports leagues. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the rst to integrate the theory of two-sided markets into a contest model of a
professional team sports league. Our model can then be used as a basic framework
to analyze the eect of dierent cross-subsidization schemes in team sports leagues.
This paper develops a model of a professional sports league with network ex-
ternalities by integrating the theory of two-sided markets into a two-stage contest
model. In professional team sports, leagues function as a platform that enables
sponsors to interact with fans. In these league-mediated interactions, positive net-
work eects operate from the fan market to the sponsor market, while negative
network eects operate from the sponsor market to the fan market.3 Clubs react
to these network eects by charging higher (lower) prices to sponsors (fans). Our
analysis shows that the size of these network eects determines the level of compet-
itive balance within the league. Depending on the market potential of the sponsors,
competitive balance increases or decreases with stronger combined network eects.
Traditional models that do not take network externalities into account, thus under-
or overestimate the actual level of competitive balance, which may lead to wrong
policy implications. Moreover, we show that clubs benet from the presence of
network externalities because club prots increase with stronger combined network
eects.
The paper is of interest to policy-makers in a professional team sports league
because we derive policy recommendations indicating that one can improve compet-
itive balance by taking advantage of network externalities. Our model shows that
an increase in the market potential of sponsors produces a more balanced league
because the small club will increase its talent investments more than the large club
in equilibrium. An increase in the market potential of the sponsors can be achieved,
3See Becker and Murphy (1993) for a discussion on advertisements as a good or bad. For
further analysis of advertisements see, e.g., Depken and Wilson (2004) and Reisinger et al. (2009).
4for instance, through an increase in the quota for the amount of advertisements set
by the league organization.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present our model with its
notation and main assumptions. We specify fan and sponsor demand, the quality
of the competition and club prots. In Section 3, we solve the two-stage game
and derive the subgame-perfect equilibria. Section 4 highlights policy implications.
Finally, Section 5 points out possible extensions and concludes the paper.
2 Model
We consider two clubs, denoted as 1 and 2, that compete in a professional team
sports league. The clubs are asymmetric with respect to their market size - that
is, there is one large-market club and one small-market club. Each club i = 1;2
invests independently a certain amount xi  0 in playing talent to maximize its
prots. We assume that talent is measured in perfectly divisible units that can be
hired at a competitive labor market.
There are two groups of agents who are interested in the competition of the
clubs, the fans and sponsors. Fans can consume sports competition in two ways:
either by buying a ticket and going to the stadium or by purchasing a pay-TV
license and watching the event on television. Either way, direct revenues for the
clubs are generated in our simple model. Sponsors are attracted to the competition
because sports events represent attractive levers that generate consumer interest.
The fact that fans watch the competition draws the attention of sponsors who want
to convince the fans to buy their products and services.
We consider the competition between the clubs as a platform that serves as the
intermediary between fans on one market side and sponsors on the other market
side. The attractiveness of a sports event for sponsors increases with the number
of fans watching. The presence of sponsors, in turn, may have a negative eect on
the attractiveness of the event for the fans. These indirect eects are modeled as
network eects in the sponsor and fan demand functions.
The timing of the model features a two-stage structure:
1. Stage: Clubs invest independently in playing talent with the objective of max-
imizing their own prots. Talent investments determine the win percentages
and thus the quality of the competition between the two clubs.
2. Stage: Given a certain quality of competition, fans decide what quantity
of tickets/pay-TV licenses they want to purchase and sponsors decide what
5amount of advertisements they want to place, taking into account the net-
work eects that operate from one market side to the other. Each club then
generates its own revenues dependent on the decisions of fans and sponsors.
In the paragraphs that follow we derive the demand functions of fans and spon-
sors under network eects and specify the quality of the competition. Finally, we
derive club revenues, costs and prots.
2.1 Demand of fans and sponsors under network eects
The demand functions of the consumers (fans) and sponsors in stage 2 depend on
the quality of the competition and are derived as follows:4 we assume a continuum
of fans and sponsors who dier in their valuation of a match with quality i between
the home team i and the away team j with i;j = 1;2; i 6= j.5 Fans and sponsors
of club i have an individual valuation for quality that is measured for fans by !
f
i
and for sponsors by !s
i. For simplicity's sake, we assume that these preferences are
uniformly distributed in [0;m
f
i ] for the fans and in [0;ms] for the sponsors.6
Without loss of generality, we assume that club 1 is the large-market club, with
a higher drawing potential, and as a result, a bigger fan base than the small-market




2. Furthermore, the parameter ms represents the total
market potential of the sponsors, or, in the case of a binding quota for sponsoring
dened by the league authority, the sponsors' bounded market potential.7 Even
though parameter ms is exogenously-given, the league authority could alter the
market potential of sponsors by changing the quota on sponsoring.
Moreover, we assume a constant marginal utility of quality and dene the net
utility for fans as maxf!
f
i i   p
f
i ;0g and that for sponsors as maxf!s
ii   ps
i;0g.
The price fans have to pay is denoted by p
f
i while ps
i stands for the price for the
sponsors. The price for fans can be interpreted as the gate price or the price for
a pay-TV license, whereas the price for sponsors is the price they have to pay for
advertisements. At prices p
f
i (and ps
i), the fans (and sponsors) of club i who are











i). Hence, the measure of fans who purchase
4Our approach is similar to Falconieri et al. (2004), but we use a dierent quality function.
Also see Dietl and Lang (2008), Dietl, Lang and Rathke (2009) and Dietl, Lang and Werner (2009).
5Note that quality i represents the quality of the competition in the stadium of club i. The
quality i is specied below by equation (5).
6Note that the parameter ms has no subscript, because there is only one homogeneous group
of sponsors in the league oering advertisements to the two types of clubs.
7Under a quota on sponsoring one can imagine restrictions on where advertisements may be
placed or on the specic types of companies that are allowed to appear as sponsors in a league.












i . The corresponding
measure of sponsors that oer advertising at price ps
i is ms   !s




Taking into account that network eects operate from the fan to the sponsor

























where nf and ns stand for network eects exerted by fans and sponsors, respec-
tively. Because the sponsor market and the fan market can coexist side by side,
an additive combination of the two demand functions can be justied.8 Note that




i. In this respect, stronger network eects induce stronger displacement of
the corresponding demand functions.
The network eects that operate from the fan market to the sponsor market are
referred to as "fan-related network eects" and are denoted by nf with nf 2 [0;1].
We assume that the fan-related network eects are positive because more fans imply
more publicity and thus have a positive eect on the demand in the sponsor market.
On the other hand, the network eects that operate from the sponsor market to
the fan market are referred to as "sponsor-related network eects" and are denoted
by ns. We assume that the sponsor-related network eects are negative because
advertisement is considered to cause a certain disutility for fans and thus to have a
negative eect on demand in the fan market. Therefore, ns 2 [ 1;0].9
The combined network eects from fans and sponsors, denoted by  are given
by
 := nf + ns:
A higher nf (or a lower ns) implies that the positive fan-related network eects
are relatively more important than the negative sponsor-related network eects.
Assuming that the positive fan-related network eects are at least not smaller than
the negative sponsor-related network eects in absolute terms (i.e., nf  jnsj 
8See, e.g., Armstrong (2006) who uses similar demand functions.
9The utility eects of advertisements may be discussed. In this context, a rst approach
chooses the track of utility-reducing eects from advertisements. The disutility from advertise-
ments can be drawn from the fact that fans go to the stadium to watch sports, not advertisements.
In the case where the actual sports event is adapted to commercial requirements, e.g., special ad-
vertisement breaks, this becomes even more obvious. For further discussion of this aspect, see
Becker and Murphy (1993), Depken and Wilson (2004) and Reisinger et al. (2009).
70) the combined network eects  are not smaller than zero - i.e.,  2 [0;1].10
Consequently,  > 0 describes a situation with positive combined network eects in
which the positive fan-related network eects in absolute values are stronger than
the negative sponsor-related network eects. If  = 0 then the combined network
eects equal zero. In this case, we have either a situation without network eects
(i.e., nf = ns = 0) or a situation with equalized network eects in which both
individual network eects are equal in terms of absolute values (i.e., nf =  ns).
2.2 The quality of the competition
Following Dietl and Lang (2008) and Dietl, Lang and Werner (2009), we assume
that the quality of the competition i depends on two factors: the probability of
club i's success and the uncertainty of outcome. Furthermore, we assume that both
factors enter the quality function as a linear combination with equal weights, that
is, the quality of the competition is represented by the combination of the win
percentage and the uncertainty of outcome.11
We measure the probability of club i's success by the win percentage wi of this
club. The win percentage is characterized by the contest-success function (CSF),
which maps the vector (xi;xj) of talent investment into probabilities for each club.
We apply the logit approach, which is probably the most widely used functional








where xi  0 characterizes the talent investments of club i = 1;2. Given that
the win percentages must sum up to unity, we obtain the adding-up constraint:
wj = 1   wi with i;j = 1;2; i 6= j. In our model, we adopt the "Contest-Nash
conjectures"
@xi





The uncertainty of outcome is measured by the competitive balance in the
league. Following Szymanski (2003), Dietl and Lang (2008), and Vrooman (2008),
10Note that the possible positive (even though small) eect of advertising on consumers (see,
e.g., Nelson, 1974 and Kotowitz and Mathewson, 1979) lowers the overall negative sponsor-related
network eects such that it is therefore reasonable to assume that nf  jnsj  0.
11We will see below that this specication of the quality function gives rise to a quadratic
revenue function widely used in the sports economic literature.
12The logit CSF was generally introduced by Tullock (1980). It was subsequently axiomatized
by Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998). An alternative functional form would be the probit
CSF (e.g., Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Dixit, 1987) and the dierence-form CSF (e.g., Hirshleifer,
1989). See Dietl et al. (2008) and Fort and Winfree (2009) for analyses concerning the eect of
the discriminatory power in the CSF.
13See Szymanski (2004).
8we specify competitive balance (CB) by the product of the win percentages, i.e.,
CB(xi;xj) = wi(xi;xj)  wj(xi;xj) =
xixj
(xi + xj)2; (4)
with i;j = 1;2; i 6= j. Note that competitive balance attains its maximum of 1=4
for a completely balanced league in which both clubs invest the same amount in
talent such that w1 = w2 = 1=2. A less balanced league is then characterized by a
lower value of CB.
With the specication of the win percentage given by equation (3) and compet-
itive balance given by equation (4), club i's quality function i as described above
is derived as
i(xi;xj) = wi(xi;xj) + wi(xi;xj)  wj(xi;xj) =
xi(xi + 2xj)
(xi + xj)2 ; (5)
with i;j = 1;2; i 6= j. A higher win percentage wi of club i induces the quality
of the competition i to increase, albeit with a decreasing rate, which reects the
impact of competitive balance on the quality of the competition, i.e.,
@i




2.3 Derivation of club revenues, costs and prots
Each club generates its own revenues such that total revenue Ri of club i is given




i generated by fans at the gate or through pay-
TV licenses and the revenue ps
iqs




































with i = 2wi(xi;xj)   wi(xi;xj)2. This club-specic revenue function, which is
quadratic in the win percentage, is widely used in the sports economics literature.
For instance, our revenue is consistent with the revenue functions used in Hoehn
and Szymanski (1999), Szymanski (2003), Szymanski and K esenne (2004), K esenne
(2006, 2007) and Vrooman (2007, 2008). Moreover, note that club i's revenues
increase with the quality of the competition i.
We further assume that talent investments xi generate costs for club i according
14For analyses of competitive balance in sports leagues, see, e.g., Fort and Lee (2007) and Fort
and Quirk (2009).
15Note that in the present model, we implicitly assume that there is decentralized broadcasting,
i.e., each club generates its own revenues. For an analysis of centralized versus decentralized
broadcasting, see Falconieri et al. (2004) and Gurtler (2007).
9to a linear cost function given by C(xi) = c  xi where c > 0 is the marginal unit
cost of talent.16
The prot function of club i is then given by revenues minus costs and yields
i(xi;xj) = Ri(wi(xi;xj))   c  xi: (7)
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In the rst stage, clubs decide on their investments in playing talent, considering
the cost of talent and its eect on their win percentage. In the second stage, given
the quality of the competition as determined in stage 1, fans and sponsors make
their decisions about how much to invest in tickets/pay-TV licenses and advertise-
ments, respectively. We apply backward induction to solve for the subgame perfect
equilibria in this two-stage game.
3.1 Stage 2: Fans purchase tickets/pay-TV licenses and
sponsors place advertisement
In this subsection, we characterize the point at which the pricing under network
externalities is optimal such that clubs obtain maximum revenue. Clubs will take
into account the relatedness of the fan and sponsor market and thus consider the
consequences of the two distinct network eects on the pricing decisions and demand






i in stage 2
by taking the investment decisions made in stage 1 as given. Note that we assume
that marginal costs for sponsors and fans are zero.
The equilibrium in prices and quantities in stage 2 is derived in the next lemma:
Lemma 1 test










i (2   nf) + ms(ns   nf)
















i (nf   ns) + ms (2   ns)




i  + 2ms
(2   )(2 + )
!
: (9)
16By assuming a competitive labor market, the market clearing cost of a unit of talent is the
same for every club. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, we do not take into account non-labor
costs and normalize the xed capital cost to zero. See Vrooman (1995) for a more general cost
function where clubs have dierent marginal costs or K esenne (2007) for a cost function with a
xed capital cost.
10Proof. See Appendix A.1.
In equilibrium, fans will demand the quantity represented by b q
f
i and are willing
to pay the price represented by b p
f
i . Correspondingly, the sponsors will demand b qs
i
and pay b ps
i for each unit of advertisement in equilibrium.17
In order to build the intuition, we consider a scenario in which the sponsors and
the fans of club i have symmetric market potential - i.e., ms = m
f
i = mi > 0. In




















Note that due to the symmetry of the two markets, sponsors and fans of club i de-
mand an equal quantity b q
f
i = b qs
i in equilibrium. We derive that stronger combined
network eects  yield higher quantities for both fans and sponsors in equilibrium.
This is intuitive because lower negative sponsor-related network eects and thus
increased combined network eects lead to an increase in the demand of fans. Be-
cause of positive fan-related network eects, this induces an increase in demand
on the part of sponsors. In contrast to the equilibrium quantities, the equilibrium
prices dier between fans and sponsors. Sponsors pay a higher price in equilibrium
than do fans - i.e., b ps
i > b p
f
i for all nf > 0 > ns. Note that the price b p
f
i for fans (b ps
i for
sponsors) is lower (higher), the stronger are the positive fan-related network eects
nf, whereas the price b p
f
i for fans (b ps
i for sponsors) is lower (higher), the stronger
are the negative sponsor-related network eects ns.
Comparative statics for the general case with asymmetric market potential of
fans and sponsors lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 test
(i) Equilibrium quantities (b q
f
i ; b qs
i) for fans and sponsors of club i increase (decrease)









with  2 ff;sg.
(ii) Given a certain quality of the competition i equilibrium prices b p
f
i for fans (b ps
i









Proof. See Appendix A.2.
17Note that if the market potential of the sponsors is larger than that of the fans of club i, i.e.,
ms > m
f








11Part (i) of the proposition shows that the stronger are the positive fan-related
network eects, the higher is the equilibrium quantity demanded by fans and spon-
sors, whereas the higher is the disutility of the sponsors' advertisement for the fans,
the lower is the equilibrium quantity demanded by fans and sponsors. It follows
that the equilibrium demand for advertisements b qs
i as well as for tickets/pay-TV
licenses b q
f
i is higher in a situation in which the combined network eects are positive
than in a situation in which the combined network eects are zero. The intuition is
as in the case with symmetric market potential above. Ceteris paribus, a decrease
in the disutility of the sponsors' advertisement directed toward the fans leads to
an increase in fan demand and consequently, due to positive fan-related network
eects, to an increase in the demand of the sponsors.
Note that fans of club i demand a higher quantity in equilibrium if their market
potential is larger than that of the sponsors - i.e.,
b q
f






Part (ii) of the proposition shows that given a certain quality of the competition
i the equilibrium price b p
f
i for the fans of club i is lower, the stronger are the
positive fan-related network eects nf, whereas the opposite holds true for the
equilibrium price b ps
i for the sponsors. This result is in accordance with the special
case of symmetric market potentials. Stronger fan-related network eects induce
an increase in the demand function of the sponsors and yields, ceteris paribus,
a decrease in the prices for sponsors. Thus, if club i decreases the price for the
market with positive network eects (fan market), it enhances the positive eect
on revenues. It follows that due to the positive network eects exerted by the fans
on the sponsors, a revenue-maximizing club has an incentive to keep prices low on
the market with the positive network eects, whereas in the market with negative
network eects (the sponsor market), it has an incentive to charge higher prices.
Whether the equilibrium price for fans is higher than that for the sponsors
depends on the relationship between the market potential of fans and sponsors and
the particular network eects. Formally, we derive the following:
b p
f










Equation (10) shows that as long as the market potential of the fans relative to
that of the sponsors is smaller than (1   ns)=(1   nf), prices are higher in the
sponsor market than in the fan market. Ceteris paribus, a decrease in the fan-
related network eects renders the fan market less important (due to its lower
12network eects) and the right-hand side of the inequality decreases such that the
inequality may not be satised anymore. In this case, equilibrium prices on the fan
market may be higher than on the sponsor market. Note that if the market potential
of the sponsor market is higher than the market potential of the fan market for club
i (i.e. ms > m
f
i ) then independent of the network eects, prices will be higher in
the sponsor market because 1 ns
1 nf > 1 for all 1  nf  jnsj  0.
Furthermore, we derive from (8) and (9) that in a situation without network
eects (i.e., nf = ns = 0), club i maximizes its revenue by making the quantity sold










i.18 That is, fans consume a m
f
i =ms-fold amount of tickets/pay-TV licenses relative
to the advertisements placed by the sponsors, and the pricing decisions with respect
to fans and sponsors are independent of each other. Finally, we see that equilibrium
prices for fans (sponsors) are lower (higher) in a situation with positive combined
network eects than in a situation in which combined network eects equal zero.
By substituting equilibrium prices and quantities of fans and sponsors from (8)
and (9) in the revenue function (6), we compute the revenue of club i = 1;2 as
b Ri = i  i = i
xi(xi + 2xj)












(2   )(2 + )
:
Note that the revenue function given by (11) satises the properties of the revenue
function proposed by Szymanski and K esenne (2004).
In the next lemma, we derive some useful properties of the function i which
will be exploited in the subsequent analysis:
Lemma 2 test
We consider i() as a function of the combined network eects  and derive the
following properties:







Proof. See Appendix A.3.
It follows from Lemma 2 that given a certain quality of competition equal for
both clubs - i.e., 1 = 2 - the revenue of the large club will be higher than the
18Note that this relationship holds true also in a situation in which combined network eects
are zero.
13revenue of the small club. Moreover, revenues for both types of clubs increase with
stronger combined network eects, where the increase is stronger for the large club
than for the small club.
3.2 Stage 1: Clubs invest in playing talent
In stage 1, club i maximizes its prots by anticipating the decisions made in stage
2. By substituting club revenues (11) into the prot function (7), we derive the
















(2   )(2 + )
 i(xi;xj)   cxi; (12)
with i =
xi(xi+2xj)
(x1+x2)2 . The solution to this maximization problem is given in the next
lemma:
Lemma 3 test




i(i + 3j)   (ij)1=2(3i + j)

c(i   j)3 , (13)







(2 )(2+) and i;j = 1;2;i 6= j.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Both types of clubs invest a positive amount b xi > 0 in playing talent. Moreover,
the large club invests more in talent than does the small club (i.e., b x1 > b x2) because
the marginal revenue of talent investments is higher for the former type of club due
to the larger market potential of its fans.19 Note that the investments of both clubs
are inuenced by the network eects exerted by fans and sponsors. Again, the
extent to which fans and sponsors indirectly inuence each other determines the
decision of each club to invest in playing talent.
Substituting the equilibrium investments (13) in the CSF function (3) yields the
following equilibrium win percentages:








By analyzing the impact of network eects on the win percentages, we can establish
the following proposition:
19Grossmann and Dietl (2009) show that in a dynamic two-period model of a sports league, it
is possible that the small-market club invests more than the large-market club.
14Proposition 2 test
Stronger combined network eects  induce the large (small) club to decrease (in-
crease) its win percentage in equilibrium and thus produce a more balanced league
if and only if the market potential of the sponsors is suciently small. Formally,
@ b w1
@ < 0 and
@ b w2






Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The proposition shows that if the market potential of the sponsors is su-
ciently small, then the win percentage of the large (small) club is lower (higher),
the stronger are the positive network eects that operate from fans to sponsors (or
equivalently, the higher the disutility of the sponsors' advertisement for the fans).
The rationale for this result is that in the case of low market potential on the part





2), higher combined network eects induce the
small club to increase its equilibrium investments more than the large club. This
results from the positive impact the network eects exert on the incentives of the
small club to invest. The opposite, however, holds true if the market potential of the
sponsors is suciently large. In this case, competitive balance decreases through
stronger combined network eects.
Thus, a league in which the positive network eects that operate from the fan
market to the sponsor market are stronger than the negative network eects that
operate from the sponsor market to the fan market may be characterized by a
higher degree of competitive balance than a league in which combined network
eects are zero. The opposite holds true if the market potential of the sponsors
is suciently large. In this case, competitive balance decreases through stronger
combined network eects.
Furthermore, note that the quality of the competition b i in equilibrium can be
expressed in terms of i as










A direct consequence of Proposition 2 is that stronger network eects imply a lower
(higher) quality of competition for the large (small) club if and only if the market
potential of the sponsors is suciently small. Formally,
@b 1
@ < 0 and
@b 2







20Note that the match quality for the large (small) market club decreases (increases) if and
only if the league becomes more balanced. As we know from Proposition 2, a more balanced
(unbalanced) league emerges in the case of suciently low (high) market potential on the part of
the sponsors.
15The impact of network eects on club prots is established in the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 test
Stronger combined network eects increase prots for both the small and the large
club.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
The proposition shows that the prots of the small and the large club increase if
the positive network eects that operate from the fan market to the sponsor market
increase or equivalently if the negative sponsor-related network eects decrease.
Thus, the two types of clubs benet from stronger network eects. To see the
intuition behind this result, remember that the prots of club i in equilibrium are
given by b i = ib i  cb xi, and thus, the partial derivatives with respect to combined









@ . Through stronger combined
network eects, both types of clubs face higher costs due to a higher investment
level in playing talent. On the other hand, stronger combined network eects have a















revenues for both types of clubs increase. The higher club revenues compensate for
the higher costs, and thus, club prots increase. Note that the positive eect on
club revenues due to stronger combined network eects holds true even though the
quality of the competition b i will decrease for the large (small) club if the market
potential ms of the sponsors is suciently small (large).
4 Policy Implications
In the following proposition, we suggest a policy measure that may contribute to
improving competitive balance in a team sports league.
Proposition 4 test
The league authority can improve competitive balance by increasing the market po-
tential ms of the sponsors.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
The proposition shows that an eective measure for improving competitive bal-
ance is to increase the market potential of the sponsors. The intuition behind the
proposition is as follows. Remember that clubs generate revenues from fans and
sponsors, where the amount of sponsorship revenues also depends on the amount
of fans aliated with a certain club (see Lemma 1). In equilibrium, the revenues
16generated from the sponsors' advertisements are higher for the large club than for
the small club due to the larger market potential from the fans of the large club. An
increase in the quota for the amount of advertising for the sponsors increases both
clubs' revenues. Due to the decreasing returns to scale of sponsors' advertising the
increase in revenues, however, is stronger for the small club than for the large club.
It follows that the incentives to invest in playing talent are higher for the small
club than for the large club, which causes the former type of club to increase its
equilibrium talent investments more than the latter type of club. As a result, the
win percentage of the large (small) club decreases (increases) and a more balanced
league emerges. Note that an increase in the market potential of the sponsors could
be achieved through an increase in the quota for the volume of advertisements set by
the league organization. For instance, the league could allow sponsoring to appear
on game jerseys or other areas that had been free of advertisements before.
Another aspect of interest is the choice of sponsors that a club makes. Based
on the above analysis, it seems reasonable to assume that there are situations in
which a club may decline a potentially attractive oer by a sponsor. This might be
the case if this sponsor has a very negative reputation and thus exerts very strong
negative network eects on the fan market. This may reduce revenues generated by
the fans to such an extent that the advertising-related additional revenue cannot
compensate for the loss in fan-related revenue. Under such circumstances, it may
be protable for a club to decline supposedly attractive oers by sponsors.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a contest model of a professional team sports league with
two market sides. The competition between the clubs is the platform between fans
on one market side and sponsors on the other market side. Positive network eects
operate from the fan market to the sponsor market, and negative network eects
operate from the sponsor market to the fan market.
Our analysis shows that a revenue-maximizing club has an incentive to keep
prices low in the market with positive network eects (fan market) and charge a
higher price in the market with negative network eects (sponsor market). The
reason is that low prices on the fan market enhance the positive eect on club
revenues due to the positive network eects that operate from the fan market to
the sponsor market. Note that an increase in the demand in the fan market leads
(through positive fan-related network eects) to an increase in the demand on the
sponsor market. If, however, clubs charged high prices in the market with positive
network eects, they would inhibit the positive eect on their revenues. Moreover,
17increased network eects induce an alteration of the demand function in the other
market. Stronger fan-related network eects induce an increase in sponsor demand,
whereas stronger sponsor-related network eects induce a decrease in fan demand.
We further derive that network externalities crucially aect competitive balance
in a sports league. In particular, we show that stronger combined network eects
induce both clubs to increase their talent investments in equilibrium. If the market
potential of the sponsors is suciently small, the increase in talent investments of
the small club will be stronger than that of the large club because the small club
will benet more from stronger network eects than will the large club. As a result,
the win percentage of the small club increases and the win percentage of the large
club decreases in equilibrium, yielding a more balanced league. We conclude that it
is important to incorporate network eects into the analysis of team sports leagues.
Depending on the market potential of the sponsors, traditional analyses of sports
leagues that do not take network eects into account may under- or overestimate
the actual level of competitive balance in a league. Based on these predictions, tra-
ditional analyses may therefore suggest the wrong policy implications. For instance,
they may suggest the implementation of measures to increase competitive balance,
which may not be necessary because the league may already be suciently bal-
anced. Finally, our model shows that both types of clubs benet from the presence
of network externalities because club prots always increase with stronger com-
bined network eects. This result holds true even though costs increase for both
types of clubs due to higher talent investments. The higher club revenues, however,
compensate for the higher costs, such that club prots always increase.
Taking a closer look at major team sports leagues worldwide, one can nd a
number of phenomena that can be explained by our model. For example, the dif-
ferences in match attendance and average ticket prices between national leagues in
European football are accompanied by strong divergences in sponsor-related rev-
enues. While matchday income (e.g., ticket sales and the like) makes up a higher
percentage of revenues in the English Premier League than in the German Bun-
desliga, sponsorship is far more important in the latter. This fact mirrors the
trade-o between fan-related and sponsor-related revenues. The quota for spon-
sorship in many North American major leagues represents another example; even
though teams might be able to obtain higher revenues by increasing the amount of
sponsoring/advertisements, the majority of teams refrains from posting advertise-
ments on jerseys.21
Our model can be used as a basic framework to analyze the eect of dierent
21Note that teams in the National Football League (NFL) are allowed to post a sponsor on
their jerseys. Only a small proportion of teams, however, makes use of this opportunity.
18cross-subsidization schemes in team sports leagues. For instance, an interesting
avenue for further research would be the extension of our model to a league with a
revenue-sharing arrangement (either gate revenue sharing or pool revenue sharing).
Revenue-sharing arrangements have been introduced to improve competitive bal-
ance and are common in professional sports leagues all around the world. The most
prominent example is probably the salary cap operated by the National Football
League (NFL), where the visiting club secures 40% of the locally earned television
and gate receipt revenue. Major League Baseball (MLB) has a revenue-sharing
agreement whereby all the clubs in the American League put 34% of their locally
generated revenue (gate, concessions, television, etc.) into a central pool, which
is then divided equally among all the clubs. The inclusion of some form of rev-
enue sharing in the model with two-sided markets could yield further important
implications for the governance of team sports leagues.
Another possible extension is the incorporation of so-called intra-side network
externalities into our model. Intra-side network externalities are network eects that
operate on one market side. In our setting, one may think that fans positively value
the presence of other fans on their market side - e.g., due to a better atmosphere in
the stadium - whereas sponsors may experience disutility if there are other sponsors
on their same market side because advertisers compete for visibility. In this respect,
it would be interesting to analyze the eect of positive and/or negative intra-side
network eects on prices, quantities, competitive balance and club prots.
19A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1






i, by taking the




































































Note that there is a positive relationship between the quantities demanded by spon-
sors and fans in equilibrium because if the combined network eects are positive,
i.e., nf + ns > 0.
Solving this system of reaction functions, yields the following equilibrium quan-
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(2   )(2 + )
:






i   b q
f






ms   b qs
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(2   )(2 + )
i:
This completes the proof of the lemma.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) In order to show that equilibrium quantities (b q
f
i ; b qs
i) for fans and sponsors of club













i  + ms(4 + 2)
[(2   )(2 + )]
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i > 0, ms > 0, 1  nf  jnsj  0 and  2 [0;1].
22In our setting it is an equivalent approach if clubs rst maximize revenues with respect to
quantities and then derive equilibrium prices or vice versa.
20(ii) In order to show that, given a certain quality of the competition i, equilib-
rium prices b p
f
i for fans (b ps
i for sponsors) of club i decrease (increase) with stronger
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i > 0, ms > 0, 1  nf  jnsj  0 and  2 [0;1].
This completes the proof of the proposition.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
We consider i() as a function of  and derive the following properties:








































2 > 0;ms > 0 and  2 [0;1]. This completes the proof of the lemma.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
In stage 1, club i = 1;2 maximizes its prot by anticipating the optimal behavior
in stage 2. Thus the maximization problem of club i = 1;2 in stage 1 is given by
max
xi0
i = ii(xi;xj)   cxi = i
xi(xi + 2xj)
(x1 + x2)2   cxi;












(x1 + x2)3   c = 0;
23It is easy to verify that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satised.











1(1 + 32)   (12)1=2(31 + 2)





 2(31 + 2) + (12)1=2(1 + 32)

c(1   2)3 :
This completes the proof of the lemma.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
In order to prove that stronger network eects induce the large (small) club to de-
crease (increase) its win percentage in equilibrium if and only if the market potential




According to Lemma 2, we know that 1() > 2() and 0
1() > 0









Now, we will show that
@(b w1=b w2)
@ < 0 and thus
@ b w1























































































This completes the proof of the proposition.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
For expositional sake, we provide a formal proof for a linear revenue function. The
proof for a quadratic revenue function is mathematically equivalent but notational
very cumbersome. We therefore stick to the case of linear revenues. In case of linear
22revenues, the prot function of club i is given by
i = iwi   xi;
such that the equilibrium investments b xi and win percentages b wi yield
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2 > 0, ms > 0 and  2 [0;1]. This completes the proof
of the proposition.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 4
In order to prove that a larger market potential ms of the sponsors increases the












(2   )(2 + )
;
23as a function of ms and write
@i(ms)
@ms = 0
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2 > 0;ms > 0 and  2 [0;1]. We know that competitive balance can








Now, we will show that
@(b w1=b w2)
@ms < 0 and thus
@ b w1

























































2(ms) holds for all ms > 0. We conclude that
competitive balance increases with a larger market potential of the sponsors, i.e.,
@(b w1=b w2)
@ms < 0. This completes the proof of the proposition.
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